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Eventuality in Fiction: Contingency, Complexity and Narrative 
Richard Walsh 
University of York 
 
ABSTRACT:  
This essay seizes upon the tension between two senses of “eventuality,” as concerning the staple of 
narrative, events, and as concerning the kind of contingency that remains unassimilated by narrative 
sense. Contingency is a manifestation of the gap between the systemic complexity of temporal 
phenomena and the reductive heuristic of narrative as a mode of cognition. Sophisticated forms of 
narrative, however, may choose to confront this gap rather than merely exhibit it, as part of their 
continual effort to refine narrative and finesse its limitations. The possibility of doing so arises 
because of two features inherent in narrative form itself, which are its latent reflexiveness and its 
dependence upon the implicit. “One of the Missing,” by Ambrose Bierce, serves as the means through 
which these ideas are elaborated in more concrete terms, exhibiting as it does both a self-conscious 
concern with contingency and narrative, and an implicit potentiality beyond its imposition of narrative 
logic. 
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The term “eventuality” captures narrative’s inherent concern with events, but it also connotes two 
contrasting ideas: the first is a determinate progression towards an outcome of the sort that is 
comprehended by narrative “logic” (or the elementary sense-making afforded by narrative form); the 
second is the unforeseeable circumstance of a contingency, a chance occurrence, which eludes 
narrative logic. Contingency, on this view, marks the gap that opens up between the reductive but 
efficient sense-making of narrative and the unmanageable systemic complexity of experience. 
Manifestations of contingency in narrative are symptomatic of the way our cognitive dependence 
upon a basic narrative logic strongly constrains how we understand complexity; but this limitation of 
2 
 
narrative may itself be foregrounded as a problem. Sophisticated cultural forms of narrative, including 
literary fiction, work to loosen the constraints of narrative’s reductive logic – principally by exploiting 
two intrinsic features of narrative itself, which are its reflexiveness, and the irreducible narrative 
function of the implicit. Literary fiction reflexively chafes at the limits of narrative sense-making in 
multiple respects, by subjecting narrative logic to the complex processes of its own articulation within 
a semiotic system. In doing so it displaces interpretative interest from its sequential logic onto the 
circulation of meaning within the complex networks of signification that narrative itself cannot help 
generating. This disposition of literary fiction is inherent in its formal self-consciousness and has, I 
suggest, two antithetical effects. One is that its reflexive movement continually confronts narrative 
sense-making with the limit of its power, in the unassimilable form of contingency; the other is that it 
continually returns to the frontier of incipient sense, in the mind’s efforts to comprehend phenomena – 
the threshold of emergent meaning where narrative cognition supervenes upon embodied experience. 
Through such a double movement, literary fiction sustains an equilibrium between affirmation and 
critique of narrative meaning, and indeed there is a dynamic reciprocity between the two. Even the 
bleakest view, just to the extent that it is successfully articulated, does more than it says; but equally, 
its value lies in the doing, the process, not in arrival at any final ground in meaning, and no pretension 
to the latter will withstand scepticism. I pursue this line of inquiry here by adopting Ambrose Bierce’s 
story, “One of the Missing,” as its vehicle. Theory, here, does not find its rationale in interpretation of 
the chosen text, because the ultimate interest lies with the theoretical ideas rather than the reading 
itself. But neither does the text function as a basis for inductive generalisation: its purpose is not to 
provide empirical support for the theoretical argument, which must stand on its own merits, but rather 
to articulate the theoretical ideas in a particular narrative context.1 
Bierce’s “One of the Missing” is an American Civil War story that foregrounds improbable 
contingencies, and attempts to motivate them in significantly contrasting ways.2 The story’s double 
representational gesture manifests a tension between systemic and narrative models of causality, and 
further leads me to distinguish between Bierce’s own communicative purposes and the textual 
dynamics of the story itself. Critical readings of the story often lean heavily upon the assumption of a 
strongly moralistic intention on Bierce’s part, founded upon the role of the satirist that was the core of 
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his literary persona. But Bierce’s satirical stance is so comprehensive in scope that it approaches a 
universal cynicism, so that the very possibility of a well-founded moral perspective is itself 
undermined. In these circumstances it can no longer be a premise that the characters and their actions 
are held accountable to an order of values; instead the very possibility of such an order becomes a 
problem. Bierce’s civil war stories, including “One of the Missing,” do in fact thematise perspectival 
problems of value and fact, not least in response to the destructive chaos of civil war itself, and to the 
subjective experience of trauma. This thematics is implicated in his recurrent defamiliarisation of his 
characters’ experiences of space and time, as in the story for which he is perhaps best known, “An 
Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge.”3 But Bierce’s own foregrounded thematic purposes are subsumed 
by the textual complexities of his story, which ramify beyond plausible attribution to any authorial 
intention other than a broad gesture of dissatisfaction with the consolations of narrative form. To this 
extent, his narrative’s relation to its own semiotic resources becomes performative, mirroring the 
insufficiency of narrative sense to the complex causal dynamics of real-world systemic processes, 
while generating a systemic complexity of its own through the excess of connotation that 
accompanies every strategy of narrative integration he deploys. 
“One of the Missing” is set at Kennesaw Mountain, where Bierce himself, serving in the 
Union Army, suffered a serious head wound inflicted by a Confederate sharpshooter. The story 
centres upon a Union scout, Jerome Searing, who undertakes a reconnaissance mission beyond the 
front line and discovers that the enemy are in retreat. Instead of returning immediately to report this 
information, he loads his rifle with the intention of firing upon the distant troops. At the same time, a 
Confederate captain of artillery takes a pot shot at what he believes to be a group of Union officers, 
misses, and demolishes the farm building that Searing is using for cover. Searing regains 
consciousness to find himself in an extraordinary situation: he is half-buried and immobilised in the 
rubble of the collapsed building, while his own hair-triggered rifle has fallen so that it is now pointing 
directly at his forehead. All his efforts to move or to turn the rifle aside are frustrated, and eventually 
his mounting terror provokes him to thrust a piece of wood against the trigger. He dies, but from heart 
failure, not a bullet – the rifle had discharged when the building collapsed. Later, the Union army, 
having received independent intelligence of the Confederate retreat, advances past the collapsed 
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building. Only Lieutenant Adrian Searing notices the body, but he does not recognise his brother, 
mistaking him for a Confederate soldier because he is covered in grey dust. The Lieutenant concludes 
from the gaunt, rigid features of the dead man that he has been dead for a week. In fact, just twenty-
two minutes have passed since the collapse of the building. 
It is worth distinguishing the different ways in which contingency is manifest in this story. 
There are, first of all, ordinary contingencies of the sort that every narrative is bound to include – 
incidental contingencies, unremarked and assumed as mere circumstance. There is neither a 
compelling reason why such circumstances should be so, nor any obvious objection to them being so. 
It is circumstantial that Searing’s route through the woods should lead him to some derelict farm 
buildings, for example; it is circumstantial that the Union troops gain intelligence of the Confederate 
retreat independently of, and simultaneously with, Searing’s reconnaissance mission. Both of these 
circumstances are essential to the story, but the story makes nothing of them. Such contingency is 
peripheral and taken for granted, and so does not disrupt the logic of narrative; it is only when 
contingency is foregrounded that narrative intelligibility is obstructed by the manifestation of chance. 
This foregrounding is, in general terms, an effect produced by two kinds of anomaly: one has to do 
with the violation of representational criteria of plausibility, the other to do with the discursive 
imposition of arbitrary narrative form. These two narrative features are not independent of each other. 
The most flagrant chance event in “One of the Missing” is the way the farm building’s 
collapse produces a situation in which Searing is alive but immobilised beneath the rubble, while the 
rifle he has just cocked has fallen in such a way that it is now aimed at his head, and he is unable to 
move, or to move the rifle, in any way except to ram a length of timber against its trigger. The story 
works hard to mitigate the improbability of this circumstance in several ways: it emphasises the 
“confusion of timbers” in the “crazy edifice” even before the artillery shell strikes it (78); it goes into 
detail about the configuration of beams, boards and debris that results (80-81); it naturalises Searing’s 
position with respect to the rifle, which presents to his vision little more than the ring of metal that is 
its muzzle, by noting that he is “somewhat familiar with the aspect of rifles from that point of view” 
(82-3); and it offers as a precedent Searing’s memory of unwittingly advancing in the face of a heavy 
cannon, only at the last moment realising the significance of the brass ring in front of him (83). It also 
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provides a narrative precedent for Searing’s belief both that a slight disturbance might discharge the 
rifle, because of its hair trigger, and that the violent collapse of the building has nonetheless not done 
so. This memory, of an occasion when he used his own loaded and cocked rifle to club a man to death 
(84), merely duplicates and highlights the improbability inherent in the current situation as he 
understands it (though in this case he is mistaken, as it turns out); the improbable nature of the 
situation is not effaced. Nonetheless, the anecdote (like Bierce’s other devices) assimilates it to 
criteria of plausibility through a kind of narrative thickening. 
There is a curious double movement to the narrative strategy Bierce employs. The result of 
the building’s collapse is an eventuality, in the sense of a particular narrative outcome, that is essential 
to the story, and as such it is simply a premise, impervious to the reader’s scepticism. Yet it is also 
highly improbable, and in this respect it foregrounds the connection between “eventuality” and 
contingency (as when, for example, we brace ourselves against the occurrence of “unforeseen 
eventualities”). Every device that Bierce exploits to incorporate this eventuality within norms of 
narrative credibility does so by confronting, and so foregrounding, its extraordinary contingency. 
Even as the devices serve their purpose of consolidating the narrative intelligibility of the represented 
event, they draw attention to the way improbable contingencies are inherently resistant to narrative 
explanation. 
An eventuality may be most broadly defined as a change of state, and in that sense it is the 
outcome of an event (etymologically, “event” itself means “outcome”; here we have in miniature the 
infinite regress at the root of narrative logic). The form of an event, as distinct from the perpetual 
seething flux of change in itself, is specifically narrative. That is to say, narrative at the most basic 
level is the mode of cognition to which we primarily resort in order to make sense of change – to find 
form in it, and so gain a conceptual grasp upon it. The basic form that narrative privileges is 
sequential: one thing leads to another. It is a rough-and-ready mode of sense making, a cognitively 
efficient heuristic that evidently proved adaptive for an intelligent social animal, and was amenable to 
further consolidation and elaboration through nurture and, more generally, culture. Intrinsic to 
narrative cognition’s formal, social and anthropocentric premises, however, are a number of 
presuppositions that it imposes upon phenomena in more or less tendentious ways. Narrative form 
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inherently implies assumptions of agency, intentionality, perspectivalism, evaluative relevance, and 
teleology, among others.4 Narrative cognition is also pragmatic, in that its adaptive efficacy depends 
only upon achieving a “good enough” balance between coping with experience and the cognitive 
effort required to do so. Accordingly, narrative cognition has horizons, beyond which we lapse from 
the domain of achieved meaning back into brute experience, the knowledge by acquaintance of an 
immediate embodied relation to our environment. For this reason, while the event is a formal 
achievement of narrative comprehension, its internal logic remains unexamined in practice, and 
ultimately enigmatic in principle. –Where the eventuality is unremarkable, it is acceptably 
unexamined for ordinary purposes, and even where it is unaccountably improbable, further narrative 
elaboration might reduce the immediate enigma to acceptably unexamined commonplaces. But 
decomposing the event into sub-events does not lead us to solid ground, and not only because the 
sequential enigma may reappear within those sub-events themselves. In fact, if we push too far in this 
direction, the connective logic of narrative becomes more and more inevitably enigmatic, ever more 
remote from the familiar territory of the taken for granted. Narrative may offer expedient sense in the 
form of the event, but when pressed beyond its heuristic function it always raises more questions than 
it answers. 
It is inherent in eventuality, then, that it presents both an intelligible, narrative face and an 
unaccountable face that eludes narrative sense. Bierce’s most extravagant expression of this double 
logic does not focus upon the highly improbable situation in which Searing finds himself, but upon 
the precursor to that situation, the circumstantial fact that a shell demolishes the building in which he 
is hidden. To account for this event Bierce goes on an elaborate digression, involving the birth of a 
child near the Carpathian Mountains, his growth into a military career, his disgrace and exile, his 
arrival in New Orleans (rather than New York) and consequent enlistment to the Confederate cause, 
and hence his presence as an artillery captain at Kennesaw Mountain. This highly condensed 
biography only converges with the main narrative at the point when this same captain, “having 
nothing better to do while awaiting his turn to pull out and be off, amused himself by sighting a field-
piece obliquely to his right at what he mistook for some Federal officers on the crest of a hill, and 
discharged it” (77). The point of the digression is to highlight the vast web of circumstance involved 
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in such an eventuality; to insist upon the extent to which the event itself is dwarfed by the magnitude 
of the systemic context constituting the set of conditions for this outcome, “the concurrence of an 
infinite number of favoring influences and their preponderance over an infinite number of opposing 
ones” (76). Bierce gestures towards multiple dimensions of this systemic complexity, yet he can only 
express its totality by resorting again to narrative, albeit in an archly ironic way. This inconceivable 
complex of contingencies, he suggests, has been overseen “from the beginning of time” by “the Power 
charged with the execution of the work according to the design” (76). Bierce attempts to convey the 
intricately systemic nature of the relations between circumstances bearing upon this eventuality, yet 
does so by framing it within a narrative conceit that subordinates the whole to the agency of an 
omniscient intelligence, for whom the “desired result” – this eventuality – is a final cause 
teleologically determining the orchestration of everything that comes before. 
“Had anything in all this vast concatenation been overlooked Private Searing might have fired 
on the retreating Confederates that morning” (77). This counterfactual statement, in which a slight 
change anywhere in the preceding context may have radically changed the outcome, anticipates the 
form of the most famous illustration of the non-linearity of complex systems, Edward Lorenz’s 
“butterfly effect”; that is, the idea that a tiny variable, such as whether or not a butterfly flaps its 
wings, can make the difference between two significantly divergent trajectories in the behaviour of a 
huge meteorological system. But Bierce's narrative conceit of a guiding agency also anticipates the 
way in which Lorenz’s example, and our cognitive dependence upon narrative, encourage 
misunderstanding. The butterfly effect illustrates sensitive dependence upon initial conditions – the 
potentially radical difference between the weather system with the butterfly and the weather system 
without the butterfly. It is our narrative bias that translates this systemic idea into the notion that the 
butterfly “causes” the hurricane (or whatever outcome is hypothesised); as if it were possible, even in 
principle, to trace a series of consequences leading from the butterfly’s act to a later state of the entire 
system. A system’s behaviour is systemic, not sequential; the significance of the butterfly does not lie 
in its positive agency but in the variation it represents between two sets of systemic relations, a 
vanishingly small difference between two states of the meteorological totality. 
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There is another reason, however, for Bierce’s assimilation of systemic contingency to a 
narrative model involving agency, intentionality, (omniscient) perspective, and teleology, and this has 
to do with the circumstance that he is writing fiction. His concern is not really to explain the 
eventuality on which his story centres, because his point is not that this is something that really 
happened. As a fiction, the story is much more concerned with the negotiation of values in narrative 
than with any directly informative purpose. It is important, certainly, that Bierce’s Civil War stories 
are grounded in personal experience. Almost uniquely among significant figures in American 
literature, Bierce saw action himself in the war (including the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain), and 
sustained a serious head wound from a sniper’s bullet.5 These facts bear upon “One of the Missing” 
directly, in its concern for historical accuracy and realistic detail, but also obliquely, in the way they 
inform its rhetorical negotiation of values. Critical commentary upon the story has tended to see it as 
strongly moralistic in tone, even if there is room for disagreement about the exact nature of its moral 
import.6 Such views seem to be supported by the ostentatiously cosmic determinacy to which Bierce 
subordinates the contingencies of his narrative. Whether the guiding power is understood as a deity or 
as Fate, its intentionality is explicitly guided by formal values, by a transcendent ethics mediated as 
aesthetics: what has been “decreed” is for the sake of “the harmony of the pattern,” a “design” that 
must not be “marred” (76). “Nothing had been neglected—at every step in the progress of both these 
men's lives, and in the lives of their contemporaries and ancestors, and in the lives of the 
contemporaries of their ancestors, the right thing had been done to bring about the desired result” 
(77). Another term we might invoke to characterise the necessity of the desired result, this specific 
eventuality, might be “poetic justice.” Searing, whose virtues as a soldier are strongly highlighted at 
the beginning of the story, proves at exactly this point to be morally base. He neglects his clear duty to 
return immediately to his commanding officers and report the vital information he has just discovered, 
in favour of the “singularly tempting” opportunity to send a bullet from his sniper rifle arbitrarily into 
the column of retiring Confederate troops (75). Bierce uses the word “murder” to characterise 
Searing’s intended act, a moral judgement all the more forceful in a context of warfare that would 
generally render the concept moot (76). On this view, there is a clear logic to the intervention of Fate 
at this point, grounded not in narrative representation but in fictive rhetoric. 
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Such moralistic readings of the story credit it with an ethical assurance it does not really 
possess, however, and that it does not assert. It certainly transpires that the story’s opening paragraphs 
present a hollow image of Searing as a heroic figure, but if he proves no better than other men, Bierce 
does not suggest he is worse. So, Searing’s motive for repeatedly refusing promotion is not noble (he 
evidently enjoys being a sniper), but neither is there inherent nobility in accepting promotion. His 
brother, the lieutenant, is a contrasting figure in several respects, but the contrast offers no clear moral 
alignment. Lieutenant Searing is “mechanically” (91) preoccupied with his pocket watch (more on 
this later) and complacent in drawing faulty inferences: “‘Dead a week,’ said the officer curtly, 
moving on and absently pulling out his watch as if to verify his estimate of time” (92). He also fails to 
draw other important inferences, such as connecting the collapsed building with the “clatter of a 
falling building” he had heard shortly before (91); and he displays no curiosity about the fate of his 
brother, who had so recently set out into these woods from the part of the Union line under his 
command. Similarly, the story seems to set up the Confederate artillery captain as a candidate for 
moral contrast with Searing, yet it tells us explicitly that this captain fled his native country in military 
disgrace, that his motive for firing his field-piece was boredom, that he wrongly identified his target, 
and that he missed.7 Searing’s intention to fire upon the retreating Confederates is pre-empted when 
he is himself inadvertently fired upon, and the reversal looks like poetic justice; but Bierce 
emphasises its contingency, and indeed the counterfactual contingency of what might otherwise have 
occurred, noting that Searing himself “would perhaps have missed” (77). If anything, the irony is at 
the expense of the conceit of providential oversight he has just elaborated. The scope of Bierce’s irony 
expands, and it remains unclear what positive moral ground, if any, anchors it. He observes, at the 
moment Searing cocks his rifle, that “it is the business of a soldier to kill. It is also his habit if he is a 
good soldier” (76). There is certainly irony lurking here, and we would be entitled to read it as 
focalisation of Searing’s own attitude; but Bierce also observes, with much less sense of internal 
focalisation, that to face firearms “with malevolent eyes blazing behind them … is what a soldier is 
for” (83). The two statements are complementary, and the irony seems less to do with Searing than 
with Bierce’s own ambivalence about war. 
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Bierce’s anti-heroic view of warfare is well established in the criticism, but it is clearly not an 
affirmation of countervailing values of pacifism or peaceful society. His ironic view of war did not 
afford him a foundation in positive values beyond it, and he remained caught up in an unresolved 
relation to “the martial spirit” right up to his presumed death in Mexico in 1914.8 The untethered 
quality of Bierce’s irony is manifest in passages like the following: 
 
… in a moment of mental abstraction he had clubbed his rifle and beaten out another 
gentleman's brains, observing afterward that the weapon which he had been diligently 
swinging by the muzzle was loaded, capped, and at full cock – knowledge of which 
circumstance would doubtless have cheered his antagonist to longer endurance. (84) 
 
This sentence is framed as Searing’s recollection, but its style and register recognisably belong to 
Bierce. It is remote from Searing’s idiom, and the thrust of its irony, especially in the last clause, is 
irrelevant to his concerns, which centre upon the rifle’s sensitive trigger and his own lucky escape. 
The chilling humour of that last authorial aside encapsulates the nihilistic quality of Bierce’s irony; it 
does not ironise certain values, so much as the possibility of value itself. 
If Bierce regards his material with an exceptionally cold eye, however, he also engages in a 
sustained imaginative engagement with Searing’s subjective experience. The title of the story, in fact, 
directs our attention here. “One of the Missing” does not foreground a moral examination of its 
protagonist, but rather the fact that his fate remains obscure to the world. The circumstances of 
Searing’s death remain unknown to any but himself, as in the case of many casualties of the Civil War 
(as, ultimately, in the case of Bierce’s own death). More generally, the subjective experience of death 
always remains untold, except in fiction; dying could be the master trope for the enigma of 
eventuality. Imagining the manner of a fictional character’s death can hardly amount to a gain in 
understanding of the particular case, of course – and empathy, especially in Bierce’s oeuvre, seems 
the wrong concept. However, fiction does offer its particularity as the vehicle for a displaced 
imaginative reflection upon whatever general (typical, moral, ideological, conceptual, theoretical, 
metaphysical) significance it may be taken to connote. Which is to say, in standard critical language, 
11 
 
fiction directs us to a thematic level of interpretation; or better, it achieves its significance by 
attending reflexively to its own narrative particulars, so that their status as facts is superseded by their 
instantiation of values. 
The exploration of values is intrinsic to the literary use of narrative. Of course, any use of 
narrative entails evaluative commitments; but the formal and thematic defamiliarisation of such 
unreflective commitments is at the core of literary fiction’s cultural role. Questions of value are also 
central, more specifically, to Bierce’s narrative negotiations with chance and complexity. Chance, 
within a narrative paradigm, is the negation of meaning; it is the arbitrary, the random, the causeless, 
and so the failure of narrative sense. When it appears unreflectively in fiction it is typically a flaw; it 
is the unwarranted deus ex machina that resolves plot difficulties without satisfying narrative logic. 
For the same reason, though, its self-conscious use is one of the ways fiction tests and challenges the 
limits of narrative sense-making. Doing so is integral to fiction’s cultural efforts to refine or extend 
the capacity of narrative, but such efforts always risk the breakdown of meaning – a mere lapse from 
narrative coherence, and from the articulation of value it affords. Literary fiction, then, involves a 
double movement of narrative disruption and recuperation; and in this it is, in one sense, well served 
by an appeal to systemic complexity. A narrative representation of egregiously contingent events can 
be recuperated by shifting to a systemic perspective, in which those events are situated as effects of a 
whole network of interactions too reciprocal, simultaneous and recursive to be traced in a narrative 
line. In this light, apparent randomness (in narrative form) is re-imagined and recuperated as 
determinate within a systemic model. However, the recuperation of apparent chance as complexity 
proves to be an equally intractable narrative problem in itself. While the form of a narrative’s events 
may be motivated as the emergent effect of systemic processes, those systemic processes themselves 
elude narrative intelligibility. Unless, of course, they are subordinated to the hypothetical perspective 
of some narrative agent capable of comprehending and directing the whole, which is just what Bierce 
does, with a derisively ironic recognition that the whole exercise has secured him nothing. In literary 
terms we may wish to say that an interrogation of values, however negative its findings, has value in 
itself; but this is not the communicative thrust of Bierce’s story. Far from being a moral tale, it is an 
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expression of nihilism; or – to be more circumspect – of the failure of narrative understanding to 
establish foundational values that will stand against his own excoriating satirical eye. 
Bierce’s narrative interrogation of the consolations of narrative occurs both at the 
communicative level of the authorial discourse and, figuratively, through the represented perspective 
of Searing himself; this is one of many formal doublings and parallelisms that structure the story. As 
such, it also exemplifies the reflexive movement by which fiction always turns its attention upon 
itself, and which becomes the first principle of complexification in literary fictions. This move is 
epitomised in the central situation of the story, the motif of the gun turned against its owner. That 
device is itself foreshadowed early on, as Searing disappears into the woods: “‘That is the last of him,’ 
said one of the men; ‘I wish I had his rifle; those fellows will hurt some of us with it’” (73). And of 
course the motif is also, in a larger sense, a figure for civil war itself. The strong metaphorical import 
of Searing’s situation after the collapse of the building raises the question of whether we should take it 
literally at all. At first sight, it could plausibly be read as a variation upon the device of “An 
Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge,” in which the protagonist’s intrepid escape from hanging and return 
home, elaborated over more than half the story, proves ultimately to occur only in his imagination at 
the point of death (27-45). However, we have to refuse the temptation to conclude, by analogy, that 
Searing died in the collapse of the building – which is the cause of death his brother infers when he 
comes across the unrecognised corpse. Other physical evidence contributing to Lieutenant Searing’s 
deduction actually contradicts it. He sees the effects of rigor mortis, and a week of dew, in Searing’s 
distorted features and damp hair; we are obliged to read them as the signs of his psychological trauma. 
Searing endured that trauma, Bierce tells us, for less than twenty-two minutes. The disparity 
between this fact and Searing’s own experience of it foregrounds Bierce’s concern with temporal 
disorientation as a symptom of trauma, and is the real basis for comparison between his two stories. It 
is reasonable to speculate that Bierce’s imaginative engagement with trauma was informed by first-
hand experience; but this preoccupation with deformed temporality also links it specifically to his 
problems with narrative. The problematic relation between traumatic experience and narrative has 
been a staple of trauma studies since Cathy Caruth’s Unclaimed Experience (1996); for Bierce, the 
problem is simply that we need to make narrative sense of experience, but trauma is symptomatically 
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intractable to narrative. Psychological trauma, in his stories, is the prime manifestation of narrative’s 
inadequacy to experience, and hence his disbelief in the possibility of value secured through narrative 
form. Whether or not the origins of this view lie in his own war trauma, the relation he posits between 
trauma and narrative is reciprocal: psychological trauma becomes both cause and effect of narrative 
dislocation. 
There are multiple ways in which “One of the Missing” uses patterns of repetition to give 
form to its material, but they tend to be strongly marked by dissonance, both for the reader and for 
Searing himself. His smile is twice mentioned, for example, and in both cases it arises from black 
humour: in the first instance, “He smiled at his own method of estimating distance” – that is, his 
conclusion that he cannot have come far because he is still alive (73); in the second, we are told that 
he had always smiled to recall the occasion when he nearly killed himself by clubbing a man to death 
with his cocked rifle, but also that “now he did not smile” (84). His callous sense of humour is just 
one aspect of the mental resilience that the collapse of the building strips away from him. Again, 
when he first regains consciousness he thinks that he has died and been buried, and that his wife, 
accompanied by his children, is kneeling upon his grave; this hallucination follows immediately after 
his own intention, in targeting the retreating Confederates moments before, of “making a widow or an 
orphan…” (78). It is also the first of two mentions of his own family, the solace of which is stripped 
away in both cases. Here, he thinks his wife’s weight upon the grave is crushing him; a little later, he 
momentarily reflects that although he cannot move he is at least facing north, towards his wife and 
children, only to immediately exclaim, “Bah! … what have they to do with it?” (85). These and other 
repetitions and parallels give form to the narrative; at the same time, as foregrounded reflexive 
moments in the narrative, they defamiliarise and ironise that form. 
The struggle to impose form, to establish meaning, is fundamental to the psychological 
impact of the traumatic situation in which Searing finds himself. His first disoriented efforts to 
integrate his current state with his prior experience are full of contradiction and incoherence; or else 
emphasise the gulf between present and past, as above. His thought process is typically digressive, in 
flight from the unassimilable event; but the reverse, a movement from irrelevance to relevance, also 
occurs. So, he wanders deliriously into “pleasant memories of his childhood” and an adventure to the 
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terrifying “Dead Man’s Cave,” only to notice a metal ring around its entrance and be brought abruptly 
back to the present (85-6). Here, the immediate phenomenon (the barrel of the gun), instead of 
prompting a centrifugal movement of association, functions as the terminus of his thought, drawing 
him back from escapism in a distressing re-convergence of memory with his present plight. That is to 
say, Searing’s trauma is compounded by the fact that making sense of it just confirms the imminent 
prospect of the only narrative closure left available to him, which is death. 
Perhaps the most disturbing manifestation of this logic in the story occurs when Searing, 
“caught like a rat in a trap” himself (79), is visited by some actual rats. Fearful that they may trigger 
the rifle, he shoos them away; but there follows, in a paragraph of its own, this sentence: 
 
The creatures went away; they would return later, attack his face, gnaw away his 
nose, cut his throat – he knew that, but he hoped by that time to be dead. (87) 
 
It is disturbing on several levels, the horrific image it presents being only the most obvious. Beyond 
that, there is the revelation that Searing, who at this point in the story is still ostensibly struggling to 
find a way out of his situation, expects to die and indeed hopes it will be before the rats return. But 
beyond that, too, is the temporal dislocation of the brutal narrative prolepsis lurking in “they would 
return later.” Because the sentence’s focalisation upon Searing’s perspective is in retrospective 
narration, the future tense is backshifted. From the authorial perspective, the rats’ return is narrated as 
having occurred, even though when the story ends they have not yet done so. What Searing knows, 
then, is that this eventuality is as certain as if it had already happened. The last related event of the 
story, in which his brother fails to recognise his corpse, confirms for us that it is indeed certain. 
The deathward momentum of narrative necessity in Bierce’s story seems to argue that the 
achieved meaning narrative affords is somehow aligned with the collapse of the conscious domain of 
human value back into physical matter, the body reduced to carrion for rats. Indeed, this is no more 
than a particularly bleak version of the equation between narrative closure and death adumbrated by, 
for example, Frank Kermode and Peter Brooks. 9 Every narrative outcome, every formal closure it 
achieves, is a figurative kind of death, suggesting that the best prospects for affirmation of life must 
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lie in the other concept of eventuality, the provisional and plural vistas of contingency. The impetus 
behind the literary complexification of narrative is in this direction, opposing narrative’s teleological 
drive towards resolution by elaborating the scope of connotation within the system of meaning itself; 
postponing the finality of an outcome in favour of the receding horizon of the implicit in semiosis. To 
the extent that it manifests as a system of connotation, literary narrative necessarily exceeds any 
bounded sense of communicative intentionality; the authorial act of communication is less 
instrumental than gestural, not delivering a message but indicating interpretative prospects that ramify 
without a determinate limit. The literary use of narrative provides for continual renegotiation of the 
balance between cognitive effort and interpretative reward that drives narrative sensemaking. In this 
particular case, Bierce delineates the outlines of his intent to represent a physical fate (Searing’s) as 
the epitome of a metaphysical one (his own and, he thinks, ours); but where, and how far, that gesture 
directs us is an open question, and depends upon our own pursuit of the centrifugal trajectories of 
association and inference. 
Literary narrative confronts narrative’s sequential logic with its inadequacy to the systemic 
complexity of life, and attempts to address that inadequacy by complexifying narrative itself. This 
move deploys both the reflexive capacity of semiosis and its unbounded openness to the implicit. It 
foregrounds the tension between the intentionality of narrative communication and the complexity of 
semiotic systems, in order to establish a parallel with the tension between narrative representation and 
the systemic complexity of the empirical world. Through such an equivalence literary narrative 
internalises the latter problem and becomes, to that extent, more responsive to it. In doing so, it also 
develops a means of negotiating between necessity and chance, by evoking an interpretative and 
representational hinterland, systemic in nature, that accommodates the (narratively) arbitrary and 
random without conceding to an absolute indeterminacy. Indeed, the term “Chaos Theory” (coined by 
mathematician James Yorke) picks out just this feature of the behaviour of complex dynamic systems 
– their deterministic production of unpredictable, apparently chaotic behaviour. 
There is small comfort for narrative understanding, however, in the idea that systemic 
behaviour is only apparently chaotic. Bierce describes the chaotic fallen timbers of the demolished 
building as an “intricate, patternless system” (79), and in doing so identifies a crucial gap between the 
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concepts of system and pattern. To identify phenomena as systemic does not in itself secure a 
cognitive grasp upon them; it does not amount to making sense, because sense – intelligible form, or 
pattern – does not inhere in the object itself (the system), but in the subject-object relation. Pattern, to 
be pattern at all, needs both to be there, and to be discerned; it is an interpretative perspective upon 
phenomena. Pattern, in other words, occupies the indefinite realm of the implicit; that which is 
available to cognition, yet only realised by it. To articulate such a realisation, cognitively or 
discursively, is to cash in the significance it affords – but also recursively to make available further 
patterning, implicit within the narrative’s own system of meaning, and so to displace and extend the 
implicit rather than exhaust it.  
Our interpretative engagement with our environment requires agency and perspective, and the 
events of the story undermine Searing’s capacity for both. The trauma of his experience radically 
disorients his sense of perspective – evaluative and spatiotemporal – in ways that emphasise the 
interdependence of his mental and physical capacities, tying his cognitive agency to his embodied 
interaction with the world. Searing’s conspicuous prowess, as first presented, is indeed both physical 
and mental; but as one critic observes of his decline from supremely able scout to half-buried 
unrecognised corpse, “A more pointed image of the disappearance of act and agent into scene would 
be hard to find” (Elmer 456). The story explicitly strips away his degrees of freedom, and in doing so 
figures narrative necessity as physical constraint. Bierce specifies in detail the movements denied to 
Searing by the tangle of fallen timbers, until the only action left for him to take is to thrust a length of 
wood against his rifle’s trigger. In doing so he is resigning his life, and indeed he does die, but from 
psychological rather than physical causes. Given Searing’s mistaken but plausibly motivated belief 
that the rifle is still loaded, it makes no practical difference whether or not it has in fact already 
discharged; the psychological effect of his fear converges with the physical effect of the expected 
bullet so that, regardless of the actual state of affairs, his need for narrative resolution equates with his 
death. The revelation that the rifle is harmless, then, is for the reader alone; it allows for a darkly 
ironic remove from Searing’s perspective, but only at the moment of its necessary extinction. By 
withholding this information, Bierce compels our full imaginative engagement with Searing’s 
experience, disallowing the detached scrutiny of a suppositious omniscience. By revealing it at this 
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point, he abruptly and cynically redirects our attention to the gap between Searing’s subjective 
torment and his actual circumstances, just when the chance of an alternative outcome disappears. 
I have so far dwelt upon the perspectival implications of narrative in evaluative terms, but 
Bierce’s story very pointedly treats narrative perspective as first of all a literal question of the 
subjective relation to environment; to situation and movement in space and time. The motif of 
estimating distance and time recurs at several points in the story, and it is the nub of its ending. The 
final paragraph just gives us Lieutenant Searing’s conclusion that the body he sees in the collapsed 
building has been dead a week, and tells us that he then moves on, “absently pulling out his watch as 
if to verify his estimate of time. Six o'clock and forty minutes” (92). The passage achieves several 
things simultaneously. The irrelevance of his watch’s clock time to the judgement he has just made, 
on the basis of the temporality of physical evidence, is an ironic commentary upon the mismatch 
between his estimate and the reality of the case. The time given also refers us back to the previous 
occasion on which he consulted his watch, twenty-two minutes earlier when he heard the fall of the 
building, and so both confirms that his estimate is wildly wrong, and tells us how distorted Searing’s 
own subjective experience of the passage of time has been since then, due to both his initial delirium 
and the state of terror in which he ultimately dies. Bierce defamiliarises temporality in his description 
of this final extreme state, both topically and through an abrupt shift to the present tense: “Here is 
immortality in time—each pain an everlasting life. The throbs tick off eternities” (88). The final 
contrast between Lieutenant Searing’s estimate and the objective facts also serves a function beyond 
its foregrounding of distorted temporality, however; it resolves the story on the theme of 
spatiotemporal perspective that has run through it. Searing himself, in his trap, grapples with multiple 
problems of perspective exacerbated by trauma and immobility. His sense of distance, in particular, is 
emphasised: the ruins of the building around him at first seem at a remote distance, “so great that it 
fatigued him” (79); once he has recognised the muzzle of his rifle, it subsequently seems to have 
moved “somewhat nearer” (84), then “an inconceivable distance away, and all the more sinister for 
that” (86). But his brother’s final act of estimation most directly echoes a phrase from earlier in the 
story: Searing’s own ironic “method of estimating distance,” based upon the fact that he is still alive. 
This mock estimation is itself inextricable from his agency and temporal perspective – “‘It seems a 
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long time,’ he thought, ‘but I cannot have come very far’” (73) – and it also alludes to the essential 
skill, for a scout, of actually estimating distance. 
The story says nothing explicit about this. Yet the question of the method of such estimation 
does correlate with another detail, which is that Searing’s rifle, we are told, is a Springfield, “but fitted 
with a globe sight and hair-trigger” (75). The reason for mentioning the hair trigger is clear enough – 
it is essential to the plot – but what we should make of the globe sight is less clear. Bierce’s detail is 
accurate, as a history of Union army sharpshooters confirms (quoting an article in the New York Times 
from the seventh of August 1861): “They will be armed with the most Improved Springfield rifle, 
with a plain silver pin sight at the muzzle, and … the globe sight at the breech” (Earley 11). Beyond 
verisimilitude, though, the detail highlights the perspectival issue of sighting. Searing is on the point 
of using this sight when the artillery shell strikes and prevents him from doing so; its primary 
significance proves to be irrelevant (as, in a different sense, does that of the hair trigger). But sighting 
and estimating distance are intimately related, through the standard method of parallax. Sighting a 
distant object with the rifle, then closing the sighting eye and using the other, will cause the muzzle 
pin to appear displaced sideways against the field. The lateral distance of the displacement at the 
target can be assessed relative to the scale of recognisable landmarks such as buildings or trees; the 
distance to the target will then be approximately ten times greater. This parallax method works by 
triangulation: the distance to the target is about ten times the lateral displacement, because the length 
of the rifle barrel is about ten times the distance between your eyes.10 It is also, evidently, a form of 
estimation grounded in embodied cognition, depending specifically upon the binocular nature of our 
visual perception of our environment. 
Bierce does not represent Searing making such an estimate of distance, nor does he refer to 
the method by which a scout would do so. This reading delves a long way into the excess of 
connotation implicit in the semiotic system of the story, and may seem arbitrary; it is not plausibly 
part of Bierce’s deliberate communicative intention. But that intention does include a prompt to 
engage in this way with the domain of connotation beyond the closed form of his narrative. Bierce’s 
intention is best understood as a comprehensive gesture of negation, the authorial rhetoric of which 
doubles his protagonist’s psychological struggle: Searing’s inescapable fall from omnicompetent 
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agent to corpse is shadowed by Bierce’s own implacable reduction of narrative meaning to its 
deathward drive. This bleak demonstration of narrative’s inability to secure a solid foundation of 
meaning or values, pursued through narrative’s own reflexive and implicit potentialities, nonetheless 
would seem to achieve literary value in the irony of its very negation, as we shall see. But it is also 
more than communicative; it becomes a performative gesture that strips narrative down to its bare 
logic, shedding implicit meanings along the way, and so does more than it says. 
An answering gesture of interpretation, then, should attend to the complex network of 
connotations beyond the linear narrative form of the story, the coherence of which is repudiated by its 
own reflexive turns. This is not an invitation to interpretative chaos, however; to discern an implicit 
motif, such as the idea of parallax as an exemplar of situated embodied cognition, is to claim that such 
a pattern of meaning is in some sense there. And the pattern is indeed there. The story foregrounds 
several moments of situated cognition in which the signs of the environment are read. Lieutenant 
Searing’s final reading of the scene of Searing’s death is one of these, and notable for being utterly 
wrong; but Searing himself repeatedly makes inferences from his environment, and much more 
successfully. Early in the story he relaxes his stealthy approach through the woods when, having 
“rightly interpreted the signs, whatever they were” (74), he concludes that the enemy positions ahead 
have been abandoned. In the immediate aftermath of the building’s collapse he deduces that his period 
of unconsciousness had lasted only a few seconds, from the dust that was still settling around him (80-
81). He determines from the shadows he can see in his trapped position that he is facing north (85). 
Most pointedly, though, when he notices the muzzle of his rifle in front of him, he establishes where it 
is pointing by means, precisely, of parallax: 
 
By closing either eye he could look a little way along the barrel – to the point where it was 
hidden by the rubbish that held it. He could see the one side, with the corresponding eye, at 
apparently the same angle as the other side with the other eye. Looking with the right eye, the 
weapon seemed to be directed at a point to the left of his head, and vice-versa. He was unable 
to see the upper surface of the barrel, but could see the under surface of the stock at a slight 




This passage both epitomises Searing’s cognitive competence and establishes the narrative eventuality 
that will determine the inexorable course of the rest of the story. Searing’s physical agency having 
already been almost entirely stripped away, from this point the breadth of his cognitive perspective 
also progressively narrows as his fear intensifies, until the point where “Nothing could now unfix his 
gaze from the little ring of metal with its black interior” (87-8). Bierce’s story insists upon the pitiless 
drive of narrative necessity towards death, and exhibits scorn for the comforts of narrative in the face 
of trauma; yet this outcome is precipitated by an eventuality of a quite different kind, an ostentatious 
irruption of unassimilable chance into the narrative order. For Bierce himself, such contingency is 
only intelligible within the frame of a cosmic narrative order he can neither really conceptualise nor 
believe; and a non-narrative order of eventuality is no order at all. For him, the orientation of narrative 
form towards its end can offer no achieved meaning beyond the corporeal fact of a soldier’s 
tormented corpse, unrecognisable even to his nearest relation. But he demands too much of narrative, 
and affirms too little in consequence; and the literary value of irony itself helps to explain why. It is a 
reflexive meta-value, here deriving from Bierce’s implied critique of narrative rather than being a 
direct achievement of narrative. Irony achieves form under a sign of negation, and in doing so 
necessarily establishes a displaced positive value of some kind. The relation between achieved form 
and ironic negation is cyclical, however; everything irony gives it can also take way. While readers 
may prefer to dwell in the phase of this cycle when achieved value comes to the fore, Bierce himself 
is not inclined to do so. For him, the only final ground of meaning is death, and it is final order that he 
demands. Yet the corporeal fact of cognitive embodiment does not equate with death, but with the 
open borders of sense, the domain of the implicit that mediates between narrative knowledge and our 
experiential continuity with the systemic environment to which we belong, in life and in medias res. 
Reading Bierce’s story against the grain, we can attend to the qualities of narrative sensemaking in 
process rather than the chimera of achieved meaning; which is to situate narrative logic, and its 
capacity for the provisional articulation of value, with respect to its premises in embodied cognition 






1. Perhaps the most useful precedent for my approach here is provided by the notion of a “tutor 
text” [texte tuteur], as invoked by Roland Barthes in S/Z (e.g., 14-15). 
2. I owe thanks to John Pier for drawing my attention to this story, in the context of a 
collaborative project on complexity and chance for the ALEA research network and the 
prospective two-volume edited collection, Figures of Chance: The Imagination of 
Contingency in the West (16th to 21st Centuries). 
3. Both “One of the Missing” and “An Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge” are collected in 
volume one of In the Midst of Life (the collection of stories originally published under the title 
of Tales of Soldiers and Civilians in 1891). All subsequent references are to the text of this 
volume, as published in 1909. 
4. The implications of this view of narrative as fundamentally a mode of cognition are 
elaborated in Walsh, “Narrative Theory for Complexity Scientists.” 
5. The only other notable author to write about his experiences as a Civil War soldier was 
Sidney Lanier. 
6. See Donald Blume’s extended discussion (83-98). 
7. Blume attempts to establish both the Confederate captain and Searing’s brother as points of 
moral contrast in the story (85-7). 
8. Bierce’s ambivalence about war, and his inability to affirm positive values beyond it, are the 
focus of Giorgio Mariani’s “Ambrose Bierce's Civil War Stories and the Critique of the 
Martial Spirit.” 
9. The formal conception of narrative resolution as death is a theme explored by Kermode in 
The Sense of an Ending (1968) and by Brooks in Reading for the Plot (1984), especially in his 
chapter on Freud and Beyond the Pleasure Principle. 
10. Explanations of parallax are easily found online. One thorough account, which covers both 
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